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Steve Emmert
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The bearing and rearing of children are the
beautiful destiny toward which a woman's whole
body and personality point from earliest childhood on. If this profound goal cannot be achieved,
the result is far too often a shriveling of the '
personality of the individual.

Dr. Marie Robinson, 1959

In Ethiopia, famine in Welo and Tigre provinces
left nearly 100,000 dead last year; some people
were so weakened that when a rainstorm struck
Dese, the capital of Welo, they drowned in a
couple of inches of water, unable to raise their
heads from the gutter.
~.
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I

HISTORICAL lO:PULATION GROWTH

No discussion of population can begin and end with
the examination of historical data, perhaps combined with
some extrapolation of past trends into the future.

Equal-

ly suspect would be any treatise which ignored these issues.
In few disciplines will one find historical trends as striking as that of population growth.
The first estimate of world population was made quite
by accident when both the Roman and Chinese empires held
censuses in the first century A.D. (1)

The figure was

somewhere "between 200 million and 300 million.
A.D., it was about 550 million.
16-~

In 1650

During the intervening

centuries, the average rate of increase was little

more than one twentieth of 1% per year." (2)

(Herein is

introduced the important concept of compound growth rates.
At a growth rate of one twentieth of 1%, a population would
double in roughly fourteen centuries.)

Since 1650, the

world's population has risen dramatically.

At about 1850,

the figure was one billion, and it had reached two billion
by 1930. (3)

Lester Brown, of the Overseas Development

Council, comments:
It took 2 million years for man's numbers to
reach 1 billion, but the second billion came
in only 100 years, and succesive billions are
coming even faster. At the present rate of
increase, the sixth billion will require less
than a decade. (4)
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The recent acceleration in birth rates has commanded respect from the media, which have devoted widespread attention to the subject.

Or1ly in the past few

decad~s

gloomy population forecasts.become commonplace.
mention of the problem, however, came

f~om

have

The first

an English

parson who soon found himself scorned and attacked from
all sides by his peers in the early 191£ century.

This

lonely man, whose ghost must surely now be smiling, is
the reverend Thomas Robert Malthus.

II
FARSON MALTHUS (5)

Thomas Robert Malthus was born in 1766 in England.
His father, Daniel Malthus, was, in the year of Robert's
birth, the first Englishman to receive the exiled Rousseau,
who was on his way to Scotland to join David Hume.

The

younger Malthus was born after the great European population increase had begun, and lived to see the beginnings
of the Industrial Revolution, which gave him his first look
at human misery.

He was educated at Jesus College in·

Cambridge, and was awarded a degree with first class honors
in mathematics in 1786.

The young Malthus saw two great

revolutions, the American and the French, the latter having
a profound influence on his thinking.
In 1798, Malthus published his first Essay on the
lrinciple of Population, (6) prefacing it with the remark,
"The following owes its·origin to a conversation with a
friend."

(The friend i.s generally conceded to be Malthus'

father.)

The immediate reactions in the intellectual com-

munity were of controversy and respect for Malthus, (7)
although skepticism was the general rule.

The poet Coler-

idge was said to have remarked:
I solemnly declare that I do not believe that
all the heresies and sects and factions, which
the ignorance and wickedness of man have ever
given birth to, were altog:ether so disgraceful
to man as a Christian, as a philosopher, a statesman or citizen, as this abominable tenet.

4

The ]!ssay was not published by Nal thus as a moneymaking
effort, since he was a man of relatively wealthy background.
It was essentially an intellectual exercise.
Malthus followed this first essay with a second, this
one signed, in 18P3.
riet Eckersall.

In 1805, he married his cousin, Har-

Subsequent editions of.

published into the 1820's.

~1althus.

the~

essays were

died of heart failure

in 1834 at the age of 68, and was buried in Bath Abbey.
Aside from his famous population theories, Malthus
contributed to the foundation of rent theory, arguing closely along the lines established by Ricardo. (8)

Malthus

formed the basis for the law of diminishing returns, and
inspired Darwin's thinking, which led to the theories of
evolution.

Despite the variety of his interests, however,

Malthus is interpreted by sensationalists only in terms of
the logical result of his work, which was his attack on the
poor laws on the grounds that they artificially maintained
a high population. (9)

III
THE FOFULATION FROBLEN

Growth
As discussed in chapter I, man's population has been
increasing at an alarming rate.

Lester Brown comments,

"The current world population growth rate of nearly 2%
annually - which brings a doubling every 35 years - is
unprecedented." (10)

The forces affecting population growth

are many, but professor Thomas Dow of the State University
of New York writes, " • • • if no change in current fertility is assumed, world population will increase from
approximately 4 billion in 1975 to 34 billion in the year
2070." (11)

As noted here, fertility represents the num-

ber of children borne by the average woman of childbearing
age.

Thus, the level of "replacement.fertility," or the

point whereupon each man and woman is replaced by one child,
would be about 2.1 children (in developed countries) per
woman, allowing for infant mortality.

In contrast, "the

fertility ratio- in much of the third world exceeds 5 .o
children per woman." (12)
growth~.in

The-.:result is that "population

the, less developed countries runs two to two and

a half times greater than the affluent countries;" (13)
Table 1 shows the distribution of world population along
with growth rates for each region.
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Table 1
World Population in the Past 30 Years,
(in millions) · ·
1970-1976
annual growth
1960
1970
Region
1976
122Q
)610
2501
World
4044
298b
1.9%
412
352
273
Africa
219
2.7%
226
239
North America 166
199
0.9%
283
216
333
Latin America 164
2.8%
1021
926
788
1.6%
East Asia
675
1101
1283
856
2.696
South Asia
693
0.6%
476
425
459
Europe
392
22
16
2.0%
19
Oceania
13
258
1.0%
USSR
214
243
180
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1 1977, p. 8.
The scope of the problem is conceded in Great Decisions:
Thus, while world population is doubling every
35 years,·the population of some of the less
develo~ed countries is doubling in 18 years or
less. ( 14)

Causes of Growth
Primary among the causes of population growth is
religious predisposition.

In addition to the well-known

Catholic doctrine, Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism are expressly pronatalist.

Indeed, with respect to Islam,

Richard Fagley writes, "In regard to parenthood, the ethos
of Islam might be generally described as procreation unlimited." (15)

In the absence of radical theological

changes, religious pressures will continue to provide a
motive for persons worldwide to have large families.
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In underdeveloped countries, a high level of infant
mortality may serve to boost family sizes.

The infant

death rate in these countries averages 33%, (16) a fact
that at least contributes to population growth.

Lester

Brown argues that "often a woman must bear six or more
children in order to be certain that one will survive
to adulthood." (17)

It is easy to see, however, that

technology is subject to much faster change than is culture, and rural mothers are now finding themselves with all
six children surviving childhood.

The result is that

"the high infant mortality rate prevailing in the LDC's
adds to the pressure for more children." (18)

In much the same way, social pressures may tend to
increase family size.

Large families are simply the custom

in many societies, and in some, a man's prestige is dependent upon his virility, which is in turn measured by the
number of his children. (19)

Everett Hagen notes:

Some observers judge that a dominant motive determining the number of children wanted may pe
the importance placed in traditional rural life,
on perpetuation of the family through the male
line •. • • • Since any given child is approximately as likely to be a girl as a boy, this
desire leads to families with a total number of
children not far from twice the number of boys
needed to insure that one will -grow through
adulthood and parenthood. (20)
In other words, having children is important, but having
boys is more important.

Frofessor Hagen adds that cer-
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tain "irrational" ·factors may raise family sizes- factors
such as manliness and relief of lonliness on the part of
the woman • ( 21 )
The Economics of the Family
Importantly, the economic ·structure of the underdeveloped countries may perpetuate;the desire for larger
families.

Ey definition, these countries are not indus-

trialized, with primary employment opportunities in agriculture.

Great Decisions explains the pressures on the

individual farmers:
The Asian peasant, tha African nomad, with no
farm machinery, little or no fertilizer, and
usually a water shortage' ·needs all the cheap
labor he can get"to wrest his hard living from
the earth. Children provide cheap labor - and
insurance for his old age. (22)
Economically, large families may be riveted into the structure of these nations, as farmers are simply making reasonable choices:
In peasant agriculture, the labor of growing
children is useful, and investment in them
yields higher· returns than alternative uses
of funds. (23)
While this concept is somewhat questionable from a macro'

,.·

~~anomie viewpoint~ it is actually a simple contrast between private and social rates of return.

While this

policy (Large families) is clearly not in the interest
of the societies, it is really the only viable option for
the individual farmer.

In this case, what is good for the

9.

part is demonstrably bad for the whole.

In order to take

advantage of the only way of life known to,them, peasant
farmers are behaving perfectly rationally as consumers.
In their industry, labor is far eaeier (and perhaps cheaper
in the short run) for them to incorporate into their trfirms."
Changes in the Death Rate
Clearly the determining factor in the sudden increase
in population growth is the decrease in the death rate.
All of the other factors, which served to stimulate the
birth rate, were no doubt formulated in an attempt to
counteract a high death rate.

The fall in the death rate

has not been offset by cultural changes to limit the birth·.
rate, with predictable results.

Folitical analyst George

Eckstein writes:
The recent and rapid introduction of modern
medical technology and public health facilities
into pre-industrial societies, rather than increased .fertility, seems to have caused larger
numbers of people to survive into the childbearing age. ( 24) ·
The effects o.f this injection of lifesaving technology
into underdeveloped countries has been dramatic:

"In

s9me extreme cases, like Ceylon, the death rate fell to
one-third its previous level in a matter of thirty-odd
years." (25)

The gravity of this condition cannot be

appreciated without some knowledge of the stages of demographic transition.
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The Demographic Transition
The demographic transition is the process by which,
through social development, a nation experiences a'fall
in death rates followed by a fall in birth rates. ·Figure

1 depicts these changes over a period of time.

Figure 1
The Demographic Transition
I
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Stage I of the transition is a period of high death rates
being compensated for by higher birth rates.

The intro-

duction of medical tachnology carries a nation into stage
II, which is characterized by a precipitous drop in the
death rate.

However, as Hagen points out, "declines in

birth rates begin long after those in death rates." (27)
With the availability of this technology, virtually every
nation in the world has passed stage I, with the greater
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part of Africa, Latin America, and Southern Asia now in
stage II.

Stage III, where both birth rates and death

rates have reached low levels, describes most of the developed world, including Europe, the USSR, and North
America.

Stage IV, where birth rates fall below death

rates, represents a mature state of population stability
or shrinkage.

In recent years, some Western

~uropean

nations, such as East and West Germany, Switzerland, and
Austria, have reached this level of demographic evolution.
Implications for Food Production
Nalthus began his essay by stating two postulates,
the first of which conceded the essentiality of food as
regards man's survival.

Agriculture professor Vernon

Sorensen argues that "at the current 2% annual increase
rate, some 70 million newindividuals must be fed each
year." (28)

Father Arthur McCormack, a delegate to the

UN Population Commission, put the problem into agricultural terms :
World food production must be doubled in the
period between 1965 and 2000 to stay even; i t
must be tripled if nutrition is to be brought
up to minimum. (29) ·

IV
FOOD AID

Dependence
United States I'ublic Law 480 provides for the distribution of

u.s.

agricultural surpluses among foreign countries.

This procedure fills both humanitarian and domestic economic
goals by increasing available grain for LDC's and preventing
domestic surpluses which would depress food prices. ·
That foreign countries have depended upon the
food is clear.

u.s.

for

Lester Brown tells the story (30) of an Indian

official who was urged to build grain reserves to mitigate
disasters.

He replied "Why should we bother?

are the wheat fields of Kansas."

Our reserves

UN F'ood and Agriculture

Organization Secretary-General Addeke H. Boerma conceded:
• • • in the past two years, things have sharply
worsened. Food production in the developing countries has fallen way behind population growth •
• • • the world has allowed itself to drift into a
dangerous degree of dependence on the prowess
exercised on the plains of North America. (31)
It is also foreseeable that "it is essentially the poorer
less developed countries that will become ever more dependent
on

u.s.

food exports."(32)

Effects of dependence
The effects of the steady stream of American grain into
developing countries are marked.

Rather than concentrating

on development projects and agricultural reform, these nations
have taken the shipments for granted and ignored farm development.
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The prevailing thought of economists is that:

• •. u.s. aid - more than 240 million tons of grain
in the last 20 years - has postponed a more permanent solution by masking the symptoms of scarcity
and lulling the poorer nations. into complacency. (33)
Martin Davidson elaborates:
• • .food aid has actually helped delay land reforms in South America and the Indian Subcontinent,
and kept a wealthy elite in power that doesn't
care for agriculture.
·
To the extent that such nations have been able to rely upon
American shipments to feed their hungry millions, no serious
changes in agrarian policy are likely.'
Not only have U.S. food shipments deterred indigenous
production, but as Senator Proxmire explains,
Food for Peace (PL 480) has been converted in part
to military purposes. As much as $150 million a
year of funds generated from the sale of American
surplus farm commodities abroad has been spent for
military purposes.(35)
Distribution on both ends has tended toward this philosophy.
The food earmarked "for peace" has more often acted to fuel
war.

In 1973, almost all of the PL 480 shipments went to the

crumbling governments of Cambodia and South Vietnam.

In

turn, the recipients usually sold the grain to finance the
war. (36)
Status of food aid
Contrary to the expectations of foreign governments, the
aid upon which they depend is hardly stable.

Daniel Balz

remarks, "· •• if there were a quick way to characterize
the national policy on food aid, it is that in times of surplus,
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the country is generous, and in times of tight supply, the

u.s.

is stingy." (37)

Efforts to end this dependence by gradual

cutbacks have been attempted, but the results have been characterized as "deep political exasperation and only questionable
results in terms of reform."(38)

Considering Mr. Balz'

statement, the developing world may fairly consider itself
fortunate that the U.S. has enjoyed four consecutive bumper
crops.

Times have not always been so good.

Frances N. Lappe

wrote in 1975 that "food aid has plummeted.

Barely one-sixth

as much food as ten years ago is now being shipped abroad from
the U.s •• ·" (39) . , Stephen Rosenfield noted as early as 1974
that "the Food for Peace program must be considered all but
defunct." (40)

The cutbacks were drastic from the supplying

end, but the crunch was felt by the receivers';
Despite the fact that more persons are in need of
food than ever before, in the past year alone, 20
million people have been cut off from Food.for
Peace programs. (41)
Logistics of food aid
The system of food aid is fraught with difficulties from
beginning to end.

The~

York Times warned in September, 1975:

• • .inspection agencies are owned by grain companies whose products they inspect • • • • Close relationships develop both between the agencies and
the companies they inspect and between individual
inspectors and grain company personnel. (42)
Ten weeks later, a page-one article blared:
• • • shipping agents, representing foreign embassies
and some shipping brokers, systematically rig~ed
quotations of charges for shipping grain. (43)
Grain that reaches developing countries may or may not
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get to hungry people.
culty in storage.

Frimary among the problems is diffi-

George Borgstrom contends that in India,

rats often eat more grain than is brought into the country
in a given month.

He adds, describing,the rats,-"their

number is indicated as being in the billions." ,(44)

James

Watson notes that "in some countries, as,mu9h as ,80% of a
food crop may be lost due to the depredations of moulds,
insects, and rodents." ( 45)
Another Herculean task is faced: in the distribution of
what food the rats leave behind.

f'opulations in developing

countries, being widely dispersed, are the more difficult to
reach due to the lack of passable roads.

Alan Berg writes of

the magnitude of the problem in India alone:
To conduct a comprehensive program in rural India,
it would require reaching 65 million farm families
in 567,000 isolated villages • • • • In the last
ten years, the largest of the undertakings has
reached fewer people than the population growth
during the same period. (46)
·
All due emphasis should be given to the prevailing conditions
in these countries so that the problem will not appear to be
one limited to dispersion of people.

~

reports that "In

Ethiopia some of the neediest areas are so deep in the
countryside that only caravans of donkeys and camels have been
able to reach them." (47)
is not available.

In short, suitable transportation

Thus, the absence of road, rail and canal

combines with a population widely strewn about the nation to
hinder distribution efforts.

The World Food Conference conceeds:
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• • • the experience of feeding
during the last 20 to 30 years
that, in general, the coverage
too limited, in many instances
of the target grouv. (48)

programs
tends to
achieved
not more

accum"'ulated
indicate
so far is
than 2%

One further complication is presented by blackmarketing.
Diversion of grain, especially emergency grain, is commonplace.

Two examples are noted

by~

and

u.s.

News and World

Report:

In Bangladesh, where thousands of people starved
last year, some officials estimate that hundreds
of thousands of tons of emergency rice shipments
were smuggled into India to be sold for profit. (49)
Inefficiency and corruption of local bureaucrats
have slowed the distribution of emergency supplies.
In Mali and Niger, officials have diverted some of
the donated grain to commercial channels for sale
at enormous profits. (50)
From an economic standpoint, of course, blackmarketing is more
"efficient" than free distribution, since it generates internal
transfers of funds, but it must be pointed out that it is
emergency shipments that are being diverted.
In any event, the Overseas Development Council clearly

summarized the problem when they pointed out that
Food aid cannot solve the LDC's food problem, the
dimensions of which are too great for imports ever
to be more than a marginal ai.d. If mis-handled,
it can, however, discourage indigenous ~reduction,
by depressing prices on local markets. (51)
This raises an important point.

In addition to the disincen-

tive to production facing recipient governments, farmers in
the LDC's are hurt by food aid (see figure 2).
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Figure 2
Supply and Demand for Grain in LDC
Food Aid

~larkets

Before and After

'ro~

Note that F1 , the price before food.aid, is much higher
than F 2 because of the increase in supply. The local farmer
must therefore make a choice among two evils:

does he sell

only Q3 t the amount he would normally sell at the lower
price, or try to sell more, thus increasing his losses?
(Incidentally, this analysis does not end with the farmer's
sunk cost, but includes such variable costs as storage and
transportation.)

This factor combines with the governmental

disincentive to provide little or no stimulus to indigenous
production in developing countries.

v
DEVELOPl\1ENTAL AID

The only viable alternative (in the long run) to food aid is
developmental aid.

This type of assistance seeks to improve

production in underdeveloped countries by means of capital
grants; in short we are "teaching them to fish" rather than
"giving them a fish."

Developmental aid is one of the most

promising means of solving many of these countries' problems.
It is not, however, without its share of difficulties.
Unemployment
To say that unemployment in the LDC's is a problem is to understate the problem almost criminally.

Population Reports

laments that
Already plagued with widespread unemployment and
underemployment, India is now beleaguered by 100,000
new entrants into the labor force each week.
According to economist Harry T. Oshima, at least
15% of the labor force is jobless in Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Halaysia, and the Fhil1ppines. One-third
of Bangladesh's available manpower may be unemployed. Indonesia's working-age population is
increasing by an estimated 1.8 million annually;
one-fourth of the nation's ~otential labor force
may now be out of work. (52)
That was the good news.
worse (see table 2).

The bad news is that it's going to get
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Table 2
Population of Children Under Age 15, with :Percentage of Total
(in millions)

% of Total
Number of Children
Region
1,439
36%
World
60
25%
North·America
Latin America
134
42%
178
44%
Africa
112
24%
Europe
66
26%
USSR
883
38%
Asia
Oceania
7
32%
Source: J?opulation Bulletin, January 1979, p. 18.
It is easy to spot the trouble zones.

Latin America, Africa,

and Asia, in which children make up 42%, 44% and 38% of total
population, respectively, will see a massive influx of laborers
in the next 15 years. (53)

As early as 1980, according to

one projection, (54) the LDC' s may face a collective unemployment rate of 30%.
Rather than creating new job opportunities, development
is likely to exacerbate unemployment.

The resulting snow-

ball effect may be difficult to remedy:
A shift to. [capital _7 intensive agriculture is
fraught wit serious consequences for the growing
labor force • • • This inevitably leads to a reduction of labor requirements, without much possibility of absorption of the displaced by other
sectors. (55)
There is no further room for employment in agriculture, because of the heavy rural overpopulation
that already exists. On the other hand, the ability
of the industrial sector to employ more workers is
seriously limited by the nature of the technology
employed. (56)
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Thus, the agrarian overpopulation would pile
up still further, concentrated on the poorest,
smallest farms which a~e already oversaturated
with surplus labor. (57)
·
Technological unemployment resulting from the
mechanization of agriculture is.unlikely to remain in rural areas. Ultimately, it will move
to the cities and further increase the amount
of underemployment in petty services. (58)
Finally, we come full circle:
• • • unemployment in the developing countries
• • • by depriving so many millions of people
of purchasing power, is the most pervasive cause
of hunger. (59)
lncome Polarization
The money generated by development aid has in the
past served to widen the income disparity in developing
nations.

Martin Davidson notes that "foreign assistance

has benefitted elite groups.

It has contributed little

to the welfare of poor people in poor countries." (60)
Lester Brown argues that "the entire rural income generated by agricultural subsidies and outlays has gone to
a small number.of big landlords." (61)

In this sense,

very little benefit comes to peasant farmers who have
invested labor in the process.

This factor contributes

to the alraedy staggering disincentive discussed in the
previous chapter.
Inflation
Whether cash or capital, development assistance carries the threat of inflation.

John Laffin explains one
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facet of' this phenomenon:
Because their own resources are limited, too much
money can cause aid-inflation, which is too much
money chasing too few goods. (62)
This developmental demand-pull can serve to cripple development efforts if it raises prices faster than incomes.
On the other hand, Lester Brown points out that cost-push
inflation is not unforeseeable:
• • • the capital investments for laying the
foundations for intensive agriculture are tremendous • • •• a sum of' about $32 billion must
be invested in the production of modern agricultural means of production. This calculation,
incidentally, more or less omits the capital
needed for mechanization • • • • ( 63)
The Green Revolution
The "green revolution" is a special type of development aid which utilizes certain high-yield grains depen!

••

dent on fertilizers.

It was intended to enable the LDC's

to dramatically increase their food production without the
great time lag concomitant to normal economic development.
Edward Goldsmith characterizes one major problem faced
by those who took advantage of the green revolution:
Unfortunately, these "miracle grains" are highly
vulnerable to disease, and therefore require
increased pesticide protection, and, of course,
they demand massive inputs of fertilizers (up
to 27 times present ones). (64)
The importance of these additions became readily·apparent
in 1973 when the price of oil· (and therefore petroleumbased fertilizers) was quadrupled.

-Time

comments:
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The Green Revolution, which only a few years
ago brought hope of agricultural self-sufficiency
to India and other Asian countries, has already
lost much of its promise. The increase in oil
prices has nearly tripled the cost of nitrogen
fertilizers and of fuel for irrigation pumps
upon which the crops of high-yield rice and
wheat rely. (65)
.
.
In addition to their high costs, the grains presented
other difficulties.

Pests tecarne more than just another

problem; they threatened the entire program.

"In the

Philippines, the miracle rice attracted ''miracle" rats,
a tough and larger breed, which decimated the fields." (66)
Biologists became concerned with the loss of genetic variability presented by the program, which converted entire
countries to a single crop.

Edward Groth noted in

Environment:
When vast acreages are planted with a single
variety of crop, the appearance of a new or
mutant and resistant strain of a pest or crop
disease organism can pose a threat not only to
just a few farmers, but to a nation • s entire
crop. (67)
·· .
Environmentalists are on the opposite side of the ecological fence from those sponsoring the revolution.

Great

Decisions comments that these environmentalists are pushing for a limit on phosphate fertilizer use and irrigation
reservoir construction, adding, "Many experts argue that
every victory for the environmentalists means a loss in
global food potential."

(68)

As noted above, the grains

are highly vulnerable to disease, necessitating the use
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of some pesticide.

In developing countries, the cheapest

and most available pesticide is DDT.

The precarious eco-

logical balance is underscored by John McHale, as he writes,
"Minute amounts of DDT have been found to reduce photosynthesis in marine plants by as much as 75%. 11 (69)

These

plants are important not only for their oxygen-producing
role, but also for their status. as the first link of the
food chain that ends with man. (70)

At the very least,

this presents a potentially insoluble problem for man in
the long run.
For all its promise, the green revolution has proven
a big disappointment.

Keith Griffin of Harvard concludes

that "despite the green revolution, the level of existence
of the masses has yet to improve significantly." (71)
Illiteracy
Yet another barrier to increased agricultural output
in the LDC's is illiteracy.

Ernest Snyder writes:

Increased production of food calls for education
of farmers in modern agricultural practices.
But th:e LDC's suffer from widespread illiteracy
(75%,in ,India) and education begins with reading.
(As one observer said, "Why ship dehydrated soy
milk foods to the starving masses when they cannot read the instructions on th:e packages'?") ( 72)
The importance of literacy in agricultural development
-

is difficult to overstate, but no more difficult.than the

task confronting anyone about to remedy the situation.
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The Barrier of Religion
In many societies, religion may restrict the potential of those societies to industrialize, ·In India, for
example, the socio-religious caste system has prevented
social interaction between classes, while Japan, without
such restrictions, has developed well ·past India despite
a paucity of natural resources.

Sociologist Max Weber

alluded to this cultural barrier in his book The :Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. (73)

This stumbling

block must be removed if the developing countries are to
achieveany perceptible economic growth.

VI
LAND

The only real alternative to mechanization and capital-intensive agriculture for nations wishing to increase
food production is increased land use.

This type of pro-

gram would avoid the unemployment problem by emphasizing
labor-intensive production.
Land Status
In many areas of the ,world, trends already point
toward increased land utilization.
that

I

However, it appears

<

• • • all the good land in the world is now being
farmed, and according to. the FAO, at present·
rates of expansion, none of the marginal land
that .is left will
be unfarmed by 1985. (74)
.
But by 1975, according to Thomas Dow, "most of the economically feasible opportunities for bringing new land
under the plow have already been exhausted •• ·" (75)
It is apparent that farmers initially chose the best farmland to work.
quality, but,

Not only is the remaining land of poorer
as~

reports,

To bring marginal farmland into use around the
world would require a massive investment beyond
the means of the underdeveloped nations and probably beyond the generosity ~r administrative
cooperation of the developed nations. ( 76)
Soil Depletion
In centuries past, soil fertility was guaranteed
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by farmers' practice of allowing an alternate field to
lay fallow for a season in order to collect nutrients.
The soaring demand for food has necessitated the almost
complete abandonment.of this practice.

The results are

summarized by Edward Groth:
The rate of depletion of soil nutrients has not
been measured, but can be roughly estimated.
Some 8 to 9 million tons of nitrogen are removed
from the soil each year in harvested crops. In
contrast, about 7 million tons of nitrogen as
inorganic fertilizer are added to the soils at
current annual rates; however, no more than 50
to 60% of that added nitrogen is incorporated
into crops • • • Some 4 to 5 million tons of
nitrogen may, there.fore, be drawn from the available natural pool in soil each year. (77)
Edward Goldsmith adds that "some of the land now under
cultivation has been so exhausted that it will have to
be returned to permanent pasture." (78)

Implicit in this

statement is that not only will total productivity fall,
but marginal productivity, as discussed above, offers
little hope of remedy.
Erosion
Lest the reader be deluded into thinking that at least
the supply of land is constant, the subject of erosion
must be raised.

Lester Brown concludes that

Other parts of the world, including the Indian
Subcontinent, the Middle East, _North and SubSaharan Africa, the Caribbean, Central America,
and the Andean countries, are losing disturbingly
large acreages of cropland each year because of
severe erosion. (79)

27

The problem would almost certainly be greatly exacerbated
if the marginal land were brought into production. (80)
Deforestation has contributed heavily to erosion
problems in South America and Africa, (81) examples which
will ssrve to deter massive deforestation efforts elsewhere.
More importantly, world desert area more than doubled in
the years between 1882 and 1952, (82) and the Sahara is
reported to be sweeping southward, in some places as fast
as twenty miles a year. (83)
In all, increased land usage does not appear to be
a panacea.

Some well-conceived, carefully supervised pro-

gram of land use is, however, essential to any effort to
expand food production.

VII
BIRTH CONTROL

All of the problems discussed in the previous three
chapters have regarded population as more or less stable
at current levels.

This is wishful thinking, of course,

since the population growth rate is about as high now as
it has ever been. ·This realization underscores the importance of population control programs, especially birth
control, in long-term development policy in third world
nations.
Jhe Necessity of Birth Control
Some type of population control program is essential
to the success of any policy program along the lines discussed here.

Holly MacNamee writes that "without popula-

tion control, all other programs are mere palliatives,
giving temporary relief in a race to catastrophe." (84)
Daniel Balz concedes that "unless there is some check to
population growth • • • there is no solution to the food
program." (85)

This is readily verified by Malthus• own

position that food supply increases arithmetically (i.e.
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, • • • ) while population increases geometrically (i.e. 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, • • • ) •

While food

production capacity has often increased at more than an
arithmetic rate, it seems still true that, in l'>'!al thus'
words, "the power of population is indefinitely greater
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than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for
man." (86)

The problem is further compounded by a fact

that has already been noted - the age structure of the
less developed countries.

The State Department points

out that "In developing countries • • • the proportion
of dependent children usually runs between 40% and 45%
of the total population •• •" (87)

Not only have these

people not hit the labor market, they also have yet to
begin to reproduce.

It is frightening to note that this

description fits India at the present time.
The Necessity of Concerted Birth Control
Without acceptance of the policy by those involved,
any birth control program is doomed to failure.

Lawrence

Summers concurs:
It seems clear that family, planning does not work
where the motivation to limit childbearing is not
strong. Mere availability of birth control is
worthless.· With:Out strong desire, £the forces
of 7 superstition, carelessness, and apathy combiiie to ensure that th.e number of children is
unaltered.
It seems safe to assume that "controlling fertility is
not ultimately a question of the effectiveness of the
techniques

but of the acceptance by the public of the

policies recommended." (89)

Professor Dow concludes that

"fertility will not declin.e to any appreciable degree
without major changes in the social setting • • • "· ( 90)
These changes may have to overcome some formidable
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barriers.

The United Nations is on record as viewing

"the right to procreate as one of the most fundamental." (91)
Moreover, many governmental policies are expressly pronatalist (92) or anti-birth control.

The New York Times

reported in two separate articles in August of 1974 that
"sixty developing countries are • • • indifferent or opposed to the idea of reducing population growth," (93)
and that
,,

The Communist block, along with a number of the
poorer nations, 'counters that overpopulation
is an effect, not a cause, of underdevelopment
and that additional population is needed in many
areas for development. (94)
This opposition to birth control is hardly inexplicable.

Richard Schroeder points out that
In developing countries, there can be a nationalist resentment toward foreign advocacy of population planning - particularly if it comes from
developed countries. A viable national population
policy can only stem from the legitimate decision of a government to deal with its own population, situation, and to devise solutions to
problems on the basis of its perception of
national needs. (95)
Equally important as a barrier to birth control is

religion, the best example of which is Catholicism.

lope

Paul VI, in the first encyclical, Humanae Vitae, spelled
out Catholic doctrine which is affirmed to this day:
• • • we must once again declare that the direct
interruption of the generative process already
begun, and above all, directly willed and procured abortion, even if for therapeutic r~asons,
are to be absolutely excluded as licit means of
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regulating birth.
Equally excluded • • • is direct sterilization, whether perpetual or temporary, whether
of the man or of the woman. Similarly excluded
is every action which, either in anticipation of
the conjugal act or in its accomplishment, or in
the development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render
procreation impossible. (96)
The result of this and other similar policies was characterized by The New York Times in 1974:
In Southern Asia - India - religious beliefs
are in large measure responsible for lack of
interest in and support for contraceptive programs, with teeming millions the result. (97)
The necessity of concerted birth control efforts is affirmed
most eloquently by the fact that the most widely used form
of birth control in the world is abortion. (98)

Lawrence

Summers states:
40,000,000 illegal abortions annually provide
ample testimony to th.e need for better family
planning programs. (99)

VIII
FAMINE

Mal thus argued that in the absence of "preventive"
checks to population, such as moral restraint, delayed
marriages, and celibacy, population would eventually be
reduced by "positive" checks, such as war, vice,
and what he called the Ultimate Check:

pl~gue,

Famine. (100)

Past Famines
To discuss the famines of the past in totality would
be a monumental task.

Cornelius Walford devoted an entire

volume to the study of famines,, in1878.

In the most recent

great famine, in the Sahel (sub-Saharan Africa) and in parts
of Asia and Latin America, hundreds of thousands perished
while millions went hungry,

The literature reported it

as follows:
The Haitian government believes that nearly
300,000 of its citizens now face possible starvation or malnutrition. (101)
India's monsoon dropped below normal, cutting
the cereal crop and eroding hopes for nearterm self-sufficiency in cereal production. ( 102)
Thousands of Hondurans face storvation in the
next four to five months • • • (103)
Across Africa's broad chest, from Senegal to
Ethiopia, the worst drought of the century continues to cut a 4000 mile swath of devastation.
After six weeks of light rainfall, nearly onethird of the 51 million people who live in this
band from the Atlantic to the Red Sea are threatened by starvation. (104)
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Present Famine
No major famine exists now, but this dramatically
understates the problem.

Ehrlich and Ehrlich report that

some "10-20 million people are starving to death annually
now. 11 (105)

This astounding figure translates into 41,000

deaths by starvation daily,. which, if concentrated, would
wipe out a city the size of Richmond in less than a week.
In fact, in the time it takes to read this paragraph (about
twenty seconds), ten people have succumbed to starvation
around the world.
These facts underscore the problem of food today.
Public attention is usually not centered on, famine unless
some major pocket of starvation breaks out.

Those 41,000

people starving daily are condemned to eternal obscurity.
Future Famine
Even in the absence of the Malthusian dilemma of
population growing past all possible subsistence, there
seems little doubt that future famines will occur.

The

International Federation for Advanced Study is quoted as
saying that "the most optimistic experts

would assign

near certainty to major crop failures within a decade." (106)
The tenuous balance maintained by the present international
order is emphasized by R. G. Anderson:
In any year from now forward, India and Bangladesh could lose as many as 100 million people to
famine. ( 107)
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In addition to the massive loss of life which characterizes all famines, widespread social problems are
certain to occur.

One writer observed:

If the population growth rate of a country continues to be high for an extended period, the
descendants of the present population will be
doomed to unbelievably miserable conditions of
existence. The demand for ·food will· outrun all
available indigenous supplies of land and water,
creating severe and chronic scarcity. (108)
Holly MacNamee elaborates:
These views of the bulging population are linked
with a number of major social problems, among
which are social instability and disruption, national division, loss of faith in th.e, nation's
ideas and institutions, growing inequalities of
wealth and income distribution among individuals
arid nations, thestress of crowded complex living, technology- augmented powers of citizen ·
surveillance and other threats to privacy, increased vulnerability to terrorism and sabotage,
enhanced powers of social and evolutionary control, and world threat of mass destruction through
nuclear and biological weapons. (109)
Important in this list of problems is the social upheaval
question - will food shortages lead to revolutionary actions
and acts of war?

Senator Humphrey wrote in 1974 that

"Starvation and hunger are the breeding grounds for political instability and economic chaos." (110)

The Yale Law

Journal reports that
Severe food shortages might stimulate acts of political or military coercion aimed at securing
adequate food supplies. (111)
Interestingly, there is some disagreement on this point.
Frofessor Jean Mayer argues that,
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Contrary to popular belief, famines (and, for
that matter, prolonged 'severe malnutrition) are
rarely accompanied by revolution. The gravely
underfed are usually too feeble and too preoccupied with problems of immediate survival to
summon up the orgaDization required to initiate
and follow through with a revolution. (112)
Th_e Ghost of TVIal thus
Barring massive famine, war, or other means of widespread destruction of human life, the world's population
seems destined to continued growth.

At some point, as we

have seen, the population must outstrip the capacity of the
earth to produce food.
One of the sources of criticism of Nalthus is his
opposition to the European poor laws. (113)

He was derided

as inhumane and unfeeling for his lack of sympathy for the
poor.

hYen today, the greater part of mankind would side

against Malthus, being as it is that "governmental responsibility for the provision of food for those who do not
have enough • • • is now universally accepted." (114)
The result of this policy should be exactly as Nalthus
had forecast.

Paul Ehrlich concedes that

• • • sooner or later, population growth will
completely outstrip the capacity of the u.s. or
any other nation to supply food. For every 1000
saved today, ~erhaps 10,000 would die when the
crunch came. {115)
·
The immediacy of the problem is shocking.

In an amazingly

short period, the threat of massive food shortages could
become a reality.

The Atlas World Press Review notes (116)
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that "each child saved today will condemn another three
children to death by hunger by the end of the century."
The world, then, is faced with a terrible dilemma:
Feed the starving masses, or abandon them?

It seems that

for all the power of Caesar and Napoleon, it is the ghost
of Malthus that will bring mankind to its knees.

IX
CONCLUSIONS

It is extremely difficult to find a satisfactory
solution to the mammoth problems facing the world in the
area of population.

Any effort at change is bound to en-

counter opposition from those who, for whatever reason,
seek to perpetuate the present structure.

As well, any

policy change is bound to suffer drawbacks in and of itself.
It seems clear, though, that these drawbacks are far preferable to the Malthusian nightmare.
Development
Despite its intrinsic shortcomings, agricultural and
economic development of underdeveloped nations seems the
best method of steering clear of long-term famine.

By

developing, these countries are accelerating their voyage
through stage II of the demographic transition.

Everett

Hagen cites studies by professor Irma Adelman and T. Faul
Schultz of the Rand Corporation that correlate economic
development and a lowering of birth rates. (117)

Michael

Endres points to the western world as evidence of the association of development and decreased fertility, (118)
and states that,
In the short run, economic development is worth
pursuing in order to lighten men's burdens. In
the long run, economic development at least contributes to the success of birth control programs;
more likek¥, it is a precondition of their success. (119)
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Birth Control
If economic development is the first step in a concerted policy to lower birth rates, then birth control
programs are the most important.

Without widespread avail-

ability and acceptance of birth control, Malthus' forecast
of the depletion of resources by a geometrically expanding
population seems unavoidable.

Development and birth con-

trol are mutually supportive:

Economic development can

help to change anti-birth control attitudes and facilitate
the distribution of birth control devices, while birth
control, with the concomitant lowering of population growth,
allows progress to be made much faster in per capita GNP.
As well, social services need not be spread so thin.
These benefits, discouragingly, may not manifest themselves
for a generation or more, but their immediate implementation will be for the benefit of·nearly all involved.
!amine Folicy
In nature, according to Darwin, natural factors will
check the population of any species by various means.

By

artificially lowering the death rate, man has artificially
increased his numbers.

It may become necessary, therefore,

to realize, beyond all humanitarian considerations, that
the best policy in a major famine may be to ignore it.
This may sound callous, but in terms of purely mathematical
concepts, it is the only rational course of action. (120)
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Presently, both governmental and intergovernmental policy
is contrary to this position, (121) whi.ch may be a very
costly piece of humanitarianism in the long run.
It is extremely optimistic to expect the world's population growth to slow dramatically on its own, or with
token birth control efforts.

The responsibility lies with

world leaders to develop a coordinated world population
policy to stave off the ghost of Malthus, whose grim task
may be accomplished sooner than we realize.
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